From Welfare State to Civil Society: Towards welfare that workd in New Zealand

Dr David G Green

1996

Preface

The purpose of this study, which was supported by the New Zealand Business Roundtable, is to suggest the guiding principles for the reform of the welfare state. Plainly any such task involves taking a view about the ideal of a free society. The report, therefore, undertakes two main tasks. First, it describes what I take to be the true liberal ethos and differentiates it from some modern doctrines which seem initially to resemble it. And second, it describes the ideal of private welfare which, before the development of the welfare state, permitted the government an essential but limited role whilst the chief burden was assumed by the unpoliticised community.

There are many people who have helped. Greg Dwyer has provided invaluable help by digging out materials and helping me to avoid misunder-standings. Among those who gave up their time to discuss particular issues with me are Michael Littlewood, Rodney Hide and Sir Roger Douglas of ACT, Ruth Richardson, John Tamihere and his colleagues at Te Whanau o Waipereira Trust, Susan St John, Gary Hawke, Bob Stephens, Mark Prebble, Alan Gibbs, George Barker, John Whitehead, Murray Coppen, Rob Laking, Graham Scott, Bryce Wilkinson, Roderick Deane and J.B. Munro.

Several people read the first draft and made indispensable criticisms, including Loraine Hawkins at the Ministry of Health, Paula Rebstock of the Department of Labour, David Preston of the Department of Social Welfare, David Thomson, Michael James, Peter Bushnell of the Treasury, Barrie Saunders, Michael Irwin and Jim Cox. I am very grateful to them all, but, of course, I absolve them from any responsibility for the final product.

Finally, I must thank Roger Kerr, Ann Henare and the other staff of the New Zealand Business Roundtable for their support. I have particularly profited from extensive conversations with Roger Kerr, who has taught me a great deal.

David G. Green

SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

  • · The welfare problem is moral as well as financial. Welfare programmes have tended to impair human character, above all because they have undermined the older ethos of 'community without politics'.
  • · Before the nationalisation of welfare, responsibility was divided three ways: there was, first, individual or family responsibility; second, the community as distinct from the state; and third, the government.
  • · Claiming a benefit was considered to be 'letting the side down' and instead of expecting the government to provide assistance, the majority of the population assumed personal responsibility for fostering a 'public but not political domain' which cared for people who were not able to support themselves.
  • · The crowding out of this tradition of concerted but non-political action for the common good has had two especially harmful moral effects:
  • - it has rendered welfare services less effective in their central task of bringing out the best in people who are temporarily down on their luck. Consequently, instead of appealing to people's strengths, the social security system panders to their weaknesses; and
  • - it has diminished opportunities for people to be of service to each other, impairing the quality of life and encouraging us to look outwards to 'the authorities', instead of inwards to our own strengths and skills, for solutions to shared problems.
  • 2. THE IDEAL OF LIBERTY:
    A RE-STATEMENT

  • · Liberty is not 'laissez faire' or 'market forces'. It is best understood as 'civil association', as distinct from 'corporate association'. A society of civil associates is based on three inseparable assumptions:
  • - human nature at its best is about assuming personal responsibility for both self-improvement and making the world a better place for others;
  • - people are seen to be united, not under leadership, but in acceptance of conditions which allow us all to exercise responsibility; and
  • - government is understood to be the upholder of these conditions, that is, the conditions for liberty.
  • · A market economy is sometimes caricatured as the celebration of selfishness, whereas classical liberals from Adam Smith onwards understood liberty as a moral ideal. Contrary to some representations, the market is not 'amoral'.
  • · A market system is morally educational in a workaday sense, but the market is not morally self-sufficient and its champions need to foster a moral order consistent with freedom.
  • · Three mistaken arguments advanced by some, but not all, free marketeers are criticised:
  • - there is no 'natural right' to be free from all interference by the state. Not all actions of the state are invasions of private rights;
  • - concern with morals is not inevitably 'authoritarian'. There can be responsibility without control; authority without commands; and respect for our common heritage without central direction. The moral order compatible with liberty is 'habitual' rather than 'intellectual'. It requires constant effort by everyone to uphold it. This dispersal of responsibility gives each person important tasks to perform-everybody is somebody-and at the same time distributes those personal strengths and skills that help to guard against intrusive governments bent on imposing partisan doctrines; and
  • - hard-boiled economism, the doctrine that man can best be understood as a maximiser of his satisfactions, is mistaken. It neglects the importance of unthinking good habits and the ethos of self-improvement.
  • 3. RATIONALES FOR COLLECTIVISM

  • · Why has collectivism retained its vitality? Five rationales for collectivism are described and rebutted:
  • - the ideals of the medieval religious corporation provide part of the parentage of modern totalitarianism and retain a residual influence;
  • - the idea that the nation-state is an economy, rather than a social order which has an economy, continues to provide inspiration for modern collectivists;
  • - modern majoritarian democracy has corrupted the true democratic spirit. The higher ideal is to confine the political process to making laws that protect us all, and to refrain from use of the political system to benefit one group at the expense of another. There are three problems: the political system has become a place where private interests bargain with governments for benefits; it has become more like a meeting of shareholders in a corporate enterprise, with national targets set for this or that and proposals put to the vote, with the outcome rarely in doubt; and law making has increasingly become the issuing of mere management instructions.
  • - claiming 'victim status' has become a popular strategy for winning political support for measures that confer advantages on some at the expense of others. Such tactics undermine not only liberty, but also the self-respect of would-be victims.
  • · In respect of the fifth rationale for collectivism, social justice, the following points are made:
  • - the relief of poverty should not be confused with politically enforced equal outcomes;
  • - merit cannot be politically enforced. Enforcing equality at the starting gate undermines the family;
  • - the duty to assist the poor has been mingled with less worthy notions, including envy and the desire to profit at the expense of anonymous others;
  • - the deliberate confusion of freedom and power, by distinguishing between positive and negative freedom, is nothing but sophistry calculated to trick the unwary into surrendering their liberty in the name of freedom;
  • - forcing the middle class into the state education and health systems does not raise general standards, but leads to middle-class capture;
  • - the claim that welfare should be universal as a badge of democratic citizenship has created division rather than solidarity. Democratic citizenship is desirable but the political process is not the only potential outlet for the desire to be a good citizen. The political process intensifies the corruption of the vote-buying process; and
  • - Rawlsian theories are useful to collectivists because they muddy the water, falsely implying that it is possible to have a little bit of equality without a serious reduction in freedom.
  • · Corporate association appeals to two personality types: first, those who imagine they will be the leaders; and second, those who welcome the release from life's cares promised by the leaders. Such doctrines tend to weaken human character by diminishing opportunities for us to develop skills and virtues through direct participation in overcoming the hazards of life.
  • · Civil association, by contrast, is intended to equip us for self-rule not political rule, that is, for non-political co-operation in joint endeavours. In doing so, it increases opportunities for service to others, whereas corporate association diminishes such opportunities and reduces our potential to grow as people, rendering us still more in need of paternalistic guidance.
  • 4. THE GRADUALLY CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF WELFARE

  • · Two approaches have emerged from the evolving welfare debate in the United States: explaining behaviour as the result of perverse incentives and contending that there has been cultural breakdown.
  • · New Zealand is in the process of repeating the American mistakes, leading to rising crime and family breakdown. Five intellectual errors bear special responsibility, namely:
  • - Behaviourism: Poor people are understood to be the victims of circumstance and the duty of government is to devise programmes to remedy their problem. The assumption that people react to outside stimuli which can be manipulated to bring about changes in their conduct provides a rationale for political paternalism.
  • - Victimism: Poverty is considered to be the result of external forces which are unjust and entitle the victim to compensation. Not only does this view undermine personal responsibility by telling victims that they are incapable of solving their own problems, it provides a rationale for group hatred and demands for political discrimination.
  • - Non-judgementalism: Moralising is seen as imposing values without the grounds for doing so. This view confuses external control with self-imposed moral restraint.
  • - Resource rights: Freedom is precisely the ability to act within a legally-protected domain of initiatives, but welfare rights are different. They are 'resource rights', or demands that political power be used to take the earnings or savings of one group for transfer to another. They are calls for other people to work or save in order that the holder of the right can live without necessarily working or saving. Protective rights, by comparison, are intended to give everyone a chance. They are mutual, whereas resource rights are confiscatory.
  • - Integrationism: Citizenship theory, typified by the 1972 Royal Com-mission on Social Security, claims that giving people spending power integrates them into the community, and that without spending power people are excluded from the community. This view assumes the solidarity of the leader and the led in corporate association, not the moral commitment and personal responsibility of civil association.
  • 5. A WELFARE ETHOS FOR A FREE PEOPLE

  • · Three requirements for a welfare ethos are suggested:
  • - we need to begin the de-politicisation of law making. This will involve constitutional reform to confine the state to its proper task of upholding the conditions essential to the achievement and maintenance of liberty;
  • - we need to restore a sense of personal responsibility and to rehabilitate virtue in its best sense; and
  • - we need a positive campaign to restore tasks to civil society, that is, to the domain of 'community without politics'. Governments should, first, step back to create the space for a renewal of public but not political action; and, second, refrain from actions which undermine personal responsibility, the family and voluntary associations.
  • · Historically, voluntary assistance through charities and mutual aid associations supplemented by a minimum safety net provided by the state offered superior protection because it attended not only to material needs but also to character. Support services should appeal to people's strengths, not their weaknesses.
  • · There were two elements of the philanthropic ethos:
  • - there was 'community without politics', a sense of solidarity with others that was based on an obligation to help others without degrading the recipient. Political solutions, by contrast, assume that lives are to be directed by the authorities and tend to be based on low expectations, with the result that people who are temporarily down on their luck are more likely to be 'locked-in' to their predicament; and
  • - there was also a sense of 'duty without rights'. Everyone had a duty to help but no one had a right to receive assistance. Giver and receiver were both expected to take pains to show mutual respect. The modern mentality of welfare rights encourages people to demand whatever they can get away with.
  • 6. POVERTY, WORK AND THE BENEFIT SYSTEM

  • · The following policy recommendations for benefit system reform are advanced:
  • - a genuinely independent voluntary sector should be encouraged by reducing the reliance of voluntary organisations on government grants. The increasing reliance on such grants since their introduction has meant the steady infiltration of voluntary organisations by politicians and political concerns. Some voluntary associations have become lobbyists for taxpayers' money and others have ceased to play their traditional pioneering role because they are fearful of upsetting their political paymasters. A distinction should be made between registered voluntary organisations, which can receive government grants but do not benefit from tax concessions, and charities which rely 100 percent on private finance;
  • - individuals should be responsible for making good any loss of income that arises from insurable events. Sickness and invalids benefits should be abolished to allow private alternatives, including services offered by mutual aid associations, to emerge. Existing commitments should be honoured;
  • - assistance to those able to work but out of work should be the shared responsibility of government and voluntary organisations;
  • - a new attitude should be encouraged. Instead of 'claim all you can get', income support should only be claimed as an absolute last resort. It should be a matter of honour to avoid claiming and to rely on savings and insurance wherever they exist. Consequently, it should be necessary to have exhausted all capital to be eligible for a benefit, and all private income should be deducted from benefit income;
  • - individuals should be able to avoid the more stringent means testing by opting to receive support from a voluntary association instead of the New Zealand Income Support Service. Voluntary organisations would be free to support individuals as they believed best, using their own money. Individuals opting for voluntary support would not be legally required to spend their savings or have their earnings deducted from benefit. Such associations would concentrate on devising personalised schemes to help people back on their feet, and would need to be free to devise innovative policies. They would be able to arrange pathways back to independence through part-time work or training or personal morale-building without the benefit system producing perverse incentives. A face-to-face relationship with a voluntary association worker will not have the same corrupting effect as state benefits because all assistance will be discretionary and subject to mutual agreement. In such a personal relationship, mutual respect, honour and good faith have a chance, whereas an arms-length relationship with a public official encourages dishonesty, bad faith and 'working the system';
  • - never-married mothers, but not divorced or widowed sole parents, should be required to work as a condition of receiving benefit. Their benefits should not be stopped, as Charles Murray and some American analysts contend, if doing so would cause too much hardship for their children;
  • - men should be deterred from fathering illegitimate children. The clear message the law should send is that any man contemplating sex outside marriage must be prepared to face the consequences of his actions. To father a child and to refuse to take responsibility should be marked out as one of the lowest things a man can do. Fathers who neither marry the mother nor have custody should pay full maintenance. If their incomes are too low for full maintenance they should be reduced to the unemployment benefit level after the payment of maintenance and the handing over of savings or non-essential assets. Those out of work should be required to work.
  • 7. HEALTH CARE IN A FREE SOCIETY

    There should be much greater reliance on private insurance. Urgent, non-discretionary treatment should be available to all, but follow-up systems for recovering costs should foster self-reliance and thereby reward those who are insured.

    The 1991 white paper on the New Zealand health system envisaged that some people might not want to rely on a regional health authority (RHA), preferring to determine what health services would be available to them. Instead they might opt to receive back the taxes they had paid for health services, and to make provision by means of an alternative health care plan.

    Relative to the status quo, this scheme had the potential to encourage health care in New Zealand to develop in a less paternalistic manner and should be revived. Individuals opting to receive care from an alternative plan could be paid a tax credit on an age-related scale.

    Hospitals (Crown health enterprises) should be privatised as access to health services can be underwritten by government funding and does not require government ownership of providers.

    8. EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY

    Education should be financed by parental payment, not from taxes. There are three main advantages for parental payment compared with voucher finance. First, payment more fully restores parental responsibility and thereby strengthens the family. Children's awareness that their parents are paying for their education creates a strong bond, helping to unite the generations. Second, there would be less reason for governments to interfere, because they would no longer have the excuse that they were exercising caution in the use of public funds. Third, taxes can be lowered, thereby reducing deadweight losses.

    A system of education tax credits should be introduced to ensure that all parents can afford to educate their children. For people on low incomes, a credit payment would be made, whereas others whose tax liability exceeded the voucher value would pay less tax. For those paying tax at source, an adjustment to the tax code would probably be the simplest method.

    It is now well established that the key to the successful functioning of any market is the possibility that new entrants will attract customers from existing providers. Without this discipline, established suppliers too easily settle down to a quiet life. For this reason, the state should not have the power to run schools, and should relinquish control over existing schools. This could be accomplished by means of a phased hand-over to independent educational trusts.

    Tertiary education should also be financed by parental or student payment. The simplest solution would be to increase fees over a 10-year period until they cover 100 percent of the cost of each course. The income-contingent student loan scheme is generally well designed and should be extended to cover students in a wide variety of institutions, in New Zealand and overseas, in competition with public tertiary institutions.

    The universities, polytechnics and teacher colleges should be privatised.

    9. PENSIONS AND SAVINGS
    IN A FREE SOCIETY

    On current plans, the qualifying age for New Zealand Superannuation will be 65 in 2001. It would be advisable to raise the age by a further six months per year until it reaches 70 by 2009. People are now fitter for much longer and have a good deal to contribute in the workplace well after they are 65.

    The present level of New Zealand Superannuation is too high. The link to wages should be abandoned and the rate set to coincide with the benefit system, as recommended by the 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy. The appropriate comparison is with invalids benefit, which allows for long-term costs, and for that reason was chosen as the rate for transitional retire-ment benefit. The 1995 net weekly rate for a single person is $173.06 (compared with $197.76 for New Zealand Superannuation) and for a married couple $288.44 (compared with $304.24).

    An income test should be retained and, at some future point, the retirement benefit should be subject to an asset test. Claimants should be expected to spend down to an agreed amount of cash and to dispose of property other than their own home or car. According to the Todd Task Force, about 70 percent of the over-60s own their own home without a mortgage.

    Because any such changes involve a radical break with the past, it would be right to give a long period of notice to allow sufficient preparation. A reasonable future date for the introduction of income and asset testing would be 2009 when, under these proposals, the retirement age becomes 70. This would allow ample time for people to adjust and make private provision.

    The TTE (taxed contributions/taxed growth of the fund/exempt benefits) regime should continue, but taxes should be cut and the special tax on the growth of pension funds lowered in line with reductions in income tax. Under these proposals the state would continue to maintain a safety net, regulate in the interests of competition and choice, and would provide useful comparative information to strengthen the hand of the consumer and enhance competition.

    Provision of income in retirement should be an individual responsibility. Retirement is a highly predictable event. Individuals have different preferences for present and future consumption. They can save to fund their spending during retirement in many ways. There are no compelling grounds for government support for retired people in the medium term beyond the provision of a modest safety net for those who cannot be assisted in other ways.

    1. INTRODUCTION

    The terms of the welfare debate have changed in recent years. For much of this century, especially since the Second World War, the ruling ethos has been welfare from the cradle to the grave. This approach began to be criticised in the late 1970s on three main grounds. First, consumers of services such as health and education were being forced to endure public sector monopolies which were providing bad service and denying choice. Second, it was producing harmful effects on the economy, including a weakening of the incentive to increase earnings because of higher taxes; higher unemployment because of the increased cost of social insurance for employers; and increased government debt due to irresponsible borrowing to meet welfare expenditure. Third, the interaction of the social security and tax systems was creating incentives to avoid work, with the effect that more people had become dependent on welfare.

    During the 1980s in Britain, the United States and New Zealand, governments came to power convinced of the necessity for radical reform to restore the market economy and cut government spending. However, by the end of the decade, it was obvious that progress in welfare reform had been very slight. Despite the many successes of 'Reaganomics' in the United States, 'Thatcherism' in Britain and 'Rogernomics' in New Zealand, the state remained a pervasive presence in all three countries, still disposing of a similar proportion of national income in 1990 as that being disposed 10 years earlier. By the mid-1990s the welfare states in all three countries, despite professed fears that they would be dismantled, had remained intact.

    In New Zealand successive governments since 1984 have controlled the expansion of welfare spending. The increasing cost of National Superannuation was held in check by limiting increases in benefits and raising the pension age. Most other benefits were cut in 1991 by amounts varying from 5 to 25 percent and eligibility criteria were tightened. Absconding parents came under more pressure to support their children instead of expecting the benefit system to pick up the bill. A new system of tertiary education funding was introduced in 1990, public housing rents have been increased to market levels and housing subsidies reformed. All told, these measures have prevented increases that would otherwise have occurred, but the thrust of policy has been the imposition of expenditure constraints, not radical reform. This focus reflects the underlying cause of the policy changes, namely the financial crisis of the mid-1980s.

    Why was progress so small in the 1980s, despite the known sympathies of the Thatcher and Reagan governments as well as successive New Zealand administrations after 1984? One common explanation is that powerful vested interests, such as public-sector trade unions, resisted change. The medical profession, for instance, fought health reform and the teachers' unions opposed educational change. Yet the British and New Zealand governments both introduced health and education reforms despite the hostility of the medical and teaching professions, who contrived to be upset even though the measures were limited in scope. So resistance by vested interests does not alone account for the lack of progress. It is also necessary to explain the limited ambitions of 1980s free-market governments.

    The underlying problem is that the majority of people still think of the welfare state as innately decent and have not yet understood the serious, long-lasting harm it has caused. Not long ago I was listening to a British radio phone-in programme about services for the blind. A caller rang in to say that it was a scandal in a civilised society that a voluntary organisation, the Royal National Institute for the Blind, provided the bulk of services for blind people. His attitude is widely shared in New Zealand. But isn't the exact opposite true? That is, the more civilised the society, the more it will be able to count on spontaneous efforts to help people in need, and the less it will need coercive intervention by the state.

    Too many people still see the state as the only certain way to discharge our obligation to the poor and unfortunate. But this view disregards our own history, and it disregards the harm that we are now discovering the welfare state does to fundamental institutions, such as the family and voluntary associations.

    The history of welfare has typically been written by partisans of the expanding state who discounted the multiplicity of private activities as a patchwork of overlapping but inadequate efforts which ought to be replaced by a single, comprehensive scheme. But new studies are now beginning to show that the reality of welfare before the welfare state in Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand was very different from the image fostered by partisan historians. Marvin Olasky, for instance, has described the huge extent of American philanthropy in The Tragedy of American Compassion;1 my earlier Reinventing Civil Society2 describes welfare in Britain before the welfare state; Mutual Aid or Welfare State,3 written with my colleague Larry Cromwell, re-interprets Australian history; and David Thomson has re-appraised New Zealand's welfare provision before 1938 (his study is produced as a companion to From Welfare State to Civil Society).4 There are two main lessons from such studies. First, there was less justification for government welfare than partisan historians have claimed. And second, the record of voluntary welfare helps us to understand what is possible today. If people living in the nineteenth century at a much lower standard of life could evolve such fine institutions, then similar achievements ought not to be beyond us as we approach the next century.

    There was an older ethos of 'community without politics' which, until the twentieth century, was an indispensable element of classical liberalism. In short, champions of liberty divided responsibility three ways: first, there was individual or family responsibility; second, there was the community as distinct from the state; and third, the government. The majority of the population assumed responsibility for fostering a 'public but not political domain' of duties to care for all those who were not succeeding for one reason or another.

    Some of those who read the first draft of this report thought it a mistake to devote so much of the report to 'ideas' rather than policies. But the welfare problem faced by New Zealand is shared by other Western countries, not least Britain and the United States, and many of the ideas which are at the root of welfare failure have been imported. New Zealand's own home-grown tradition was abandoned under the influence of ideas from overseas, especially the United States since the late 1960s. These intellectual errors, as I see them, are the chief cause of the failure of welfare statism and for this reason I have concentrated on combating them and on re-stating the ideal of a free society and its associated ethos of private welfare.

    Organisation of the Study

    The first difficulty in proposing the reform of any modern institution is that the protagonists are frequently affected by partisan politics and the language used is riddled with ambiguity. There is no agreed meaning even for fundamental terms such as freedom, equality, justice, democracy and community. Some clearing of the ground is, therefore, indispensable if confusion is not to reign. But the task is not merely one of defining terms, though it obviously helps if protagonists use the same words to mean the same things. It is more a matter of explaining the historical tradition of thought from which my arguments emerge. Chapter 2, therefore, begins with a description of what I take to be the mainstream tradition of liberty.

    Chapter 3 offers an explanation of the continued strength of collectivist thought, describing its historical roots and modern-day counterparts.

    Then, armed with what I hope will be agreed is an accurate and helpful method of looking at the ideal of freedom, I turn to more specific issues. Chapter 4 assesses the welfare problem as it is being perceived in Britain, the United States and New Zealand. Chapter 5 suggests how we could create a new division of responsibility between the state and civil society, and describes the ethos of 'community without politics' which is central to the ideal of civil association.

    The remaining chapters each deal with one issue. Chapter 6 proposes alternative methods of relieving poverty, Chapter 7 advocates health care reform, Chapter 8 deals with education and Chapter 9 is concerned with savings, including pension provision.